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Abstract
Background: Hospital policy involves multiple objectives: efficiency of service delivery, pursuit of
high quality care, promoting access. Funding policy based on hospital casemix has traditionally been
considered to be only about promoting efficiency.
Discussion: Formula-based funding policy can be (and has been) used to pursue a range of policy
objectives, not only efficiency. These are termed 'adjunct' goals. Strategies to incorporate adjunct
goals into funding design must, implicitly or explicitly, address key decision choices outlined in this
paper.
Summary: Policy must be clear and explicit about the behaviour to be rewarded; incentives must
be designed so that all facilities with an opportunity to improve have an opportunity to benefit; the
reward structure is stable and meaningful; and the funder monitors performance and gaming.
Background
Over the last twenty-five years, hospital funding systems
have evolved to reduce idiosyncratic and historical ways
of funding, replacing these methods with formulae or
market based systems, such as casemix funding, to pro-
mote technical efficiency, minimising cost per patient
treated [1].
But emphasising technical efficiency is not the only objec-
tive of health funding policy: in capped funding environ-
ments there needs to be a parallel focus on access, and in
all environments, a focus on quality. With the singular
exception of the equity-oriented 'disproportionate share'
incentives in the US Medicare prospective payment design
[2], in early formula funding implementations policy
instruments to achieve "adjunct" policy goals of access
and quality were regulatory (or hierarchical) in nature. As
the ability to measure performance in domains relevant to
adjunct goals has improved, control mechanisms shifted
from hierarchical to market-like mechanisms [3,4] and a
literature on the effectiveness of incentives developed
[5,6]. The 'equal compensation principle', from the eco-
nomics literature, postulates that when employees (or
subsidiary organisational units) are assigned multiple
tasks/goals, compensation design must ensure that the
marginal rate of return to the employee (unit) for all tasks
is equal [7]. In line with this, contemporary formula fund-
ing arrangements are increasingly using market-like
incentives for adjunct goals (for an argument favouring
mixed systems of payment when multiple objectives are
being pursued see Eggleston [8]). The United States Insti-
tute of Medicine has recommended expansion of pay for
performance [9] and providers expect that such incentive
programs will grow in scope in the future [10]. Berg et al
has extended this approach to vary consumer co-payments
to take account of adjunct goals, specifically quality [11].
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An emphasis on adjunct goals also emerged because of
recognition of weakness in measures of hospital product.
The standard measure of inpatient activity, a treated
patient, incorporates an implicit assumption about
homogeneity of quality of care and other attributes. To the
extent these attributes are unmeasured (or unmeasurable)
the purchaser (such as primary care trusts in the United
Kingdom or an Area Health Authority), or principal, is
exposed to the risks involved in asymmetry of informa-
tion with agents: moral hazard (such as saving money by
skimping on quality because it is unmeasured) and
adverse selection (providers selecting patients likely to be
less costly). Optimal contracts in these situations should
involve improved signalling about desirable behaviour
[12] and increased use of adjunct incentives is one
approach to this.
There are two broad approaches to funding health serv-
ices: casemix and population. Population-based funding
is designed to improve efficiency by promoting appropri-
ate location of care and investment in prevention, but it
also promotes a quality-oriented adjunct goal of improv-
ing care continuity through service integration [13]. Apart
from that design feature, adjunct incentives are more com-
monly seen in casemix funding systems compared to pop-
ulation-based funding systems, partly because of
casemix's stronger emphasis on incentives on providers,
so this paper focuses on incentives in the context of
casemix funding.
Market-like incentives for adjunct goals are designed to
strengthen the alignment of the goals of peripheral units
(areas, regions, hospitals) and those of the centre. This
paper identifies potential adjunct incentives and outlines
principles associated with the design of incentives to be
incorporated into casemix funding policy. It is primarily
focused on incentives relating to the principal "product
stream" in hospital funding: patient treatment. It does not
address incentives associated with other key product
streams such as clinical education or research. Nor does it
address cost-related adjusters (such as for specific equity




A range of potential market-like instruments can be used
to create adjunct incentives. Instruments can be character-
ised on a number of key dimensions:
• Goal, target or domain
￿ Nature of the mechanism or instrument (continuous or
threshold based)
￿ Uncapped vs. capped
￿ Competitive vs. non-competitive
￿ Positive or negative
￿ Timing
The principal categorisation of adjunct incentives is the
goal, target or domain that is the object of the incentive.
Adjunct incentives have been designed across a range of
domains including quality of care, access, prevention and
coding quality.
A key role for adjunct incentives is to counteract perverse
or unintended consequences of the funding formula.
Some funding arrangements may effectively reward poor
quality, for example, encouraging over utilisation or
unnecessary diagnostic testing [14]. Under casemix fund-
ing the inherent efficiency incentives may lead hospitals
to seek to achieve improved efficiency, narrowly defined,
by reducing quality of care. In the US Medicare implemen-
tation of prospective payment, this perverse incentive was
redressed through monitoring by Professional Standards
Review Organisations [2]; in the Victorian (Australia)
implementation, a monetary incentive was used to reward
hospital accreditation, supplemented by a regulatory
approach, monitoring of readmissions [15].
The quality domain has attracted the greatest interest of all
potential areas for introducing market-based adjunct
incentives, complementing other quality-related strategies
such as selective contracting and use of report cards
[16,17]. There has been a significant increase in interest in
incentives for provision of higher quality of care in the
United States in recent years, with interest across all
phases of improved reporting ('pay for reporting'), pay for
participation in quality improvement initiatives, and 'Pay
for Performance' or 'P4P' [18]. Although P4P risks being
another 'unicorn' in terms of health policy, much talked
about, never seen [19], several quality incentives have
been developed, for example, including a bonus payment
for treatments that adhere to particular care paths or for
care meeting specified process indicators [20]. Similar ini-
tiatives have been implemented in Nicaragua and Costa
Rica [21] and are under consideration in Canada [22].
Averill et al have recently proposed to incorporate a qual-
ity adjustment directly into the price paid by removing the
effect of complications (as distinct from co-morbidities
present on admission) from casemix assignment [23].
Gosfield has proposed a new payment approach based on
funding according to care paths, with bonuses for effi-
ciency and consumer satisfaction [24]. Although the
empirical support for some of the initiatives is weak
[25,26], hospitals have been shown to respond to theseBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/72
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incentives with process or structural changes [27-29] and
they can strengthen the internal 'business case' for imple-
menting patient safety initiatives [30]. An important study
by Lindenauer et al showed a statistically significant
improvement in quality measures compared to controls
for quite modest levels of incentives at the margin: 1–2%
depending on performance [31].
In capped funding systems, incentives for hospitals to
address priority access goals are also important. Here
incentives on area services to redress a perverse incentive
to under-provide may be required. The Victorian imple-
mentation of casemix funding incorporated a strong
incentive for hospitals to ensure that urgent elective sur-
gery cases were treated within a clinically acceptable time
frame [32]. Subsequent adjunct incentives were intro-
duced in Victoria to place a parallel incentive for hospital
emergency department performance [33,34].
Prospective payment arrangements generally incorporate
measures to ensure appropriate coding quality such as
audits, with penalties for poor coding performance, and
incentives to ensure coding timeliness. It is also possible
to contemplate incentives on area health services or hos-
pitals in terms of prevention, particularly through dis-
counted payments for admissions which might be better
treated in a primary care setting and incentives for appro-
priateness of admission, through discounts for excess
admissions in procedures exhibiting high variability.
Process measures of good preventive care have also been
used in the design of incentives for managed care organi-
sations [25] and general practice [35].
Table 1 shows indicators that can be used as a basis for
adjunct incentives in a range of domains.
Table 1: DOMAINS OF PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL INDICATORS
DOMAIN INDICATOR POSSIBLE INCENTIVE DESIGN
QUALITY • Clinical indicators e.g. % adherence to specific 
treatment for specific disease
• Incremental payment where evidence of specific indicator
• Adherence to (any) endorsed care path • Increment for adherence to care path
• Provision of data to allow clinical benchmarking • Payment for provision of data
• Achievement of hospital accreditation • Bonus for accreditation
• Complications which arise during course of 
treatment (such as adverse events)
• Remove complications (which occur after the patient was 
admitted, contrasting with comorbidities which were present 
on admission) from the definition of DRG and hence 
determination of casemix payment
• Score on consumer satisfaction questionnaire • Incremental payment
• Appropriateness of care such as measured by 
agreed instrument
• Discount payment for cases which do not meet 
appropriateness of admission criteria as they are of less 
'value' to purchaser
• Propensity to admit conditions that exhibit high 
geographic variation such as carpal tunnel operations.
• Reduce "profitability" of these cases by discounted payment 
for admission of high variability conditions
ACCESS • Elective surgery waiting times • Discount/penalties for high percent or number of patients 
waiting in excess of threshold time
• Premium paid for patients treated within acceptable 
timeframe (or penalty for revenue).
• Additional payments (or access to other types of additional 
funding arrangements) if negotiated target reduction in long 
wait patients achieved.
• Hospital emergency service times to treatment (by 
triage category)
• Penalties for failure to achieve threshold treatment time 
goals
• Long stays in hospital emergency service • Penalties for number of patients denied timely admission to 
ward.
PREVENTION • Avoidable hospital admissions • Discounted payment for avoidable admissions
• Avoidable mortality • Penalty in population funding formula for excess avoidable 
mortality
CODING QUALITY AND 
TIMELINESS
• Timeliness • Zero payment for submission of data outside specific 
timeframes
• Incidence of "error" DRGs • Discounted payment for 'error' DRG codes.
• Coding error as measured by audit • Penalty for upcoding (eg. double deduction where 
overcoding found).BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/72
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With multiple goals comes the prospect of goals conflict
e.g. is there a trade-off between quality and access? Incen-
tive design can explicitly deal with such goal trade-off by
incorporating multiple measures to determine incentive
payments. The relative size of any bonus or penalty (or the
relative weighting in any aggregate measure of perform-
ance) implicitly reveals the preferences of purchasers/
funders as to the relative importance of the different goals.
As noted below, performance thresholds for access to
incentives can also be used to address multiple goals.
A second broad characteristic of market-like adjunct
incentives relates to the design of the incentive in terms of
the mechanism or instrument. Here there are two broad
approaches to instrument design with both having advan-
tages [36]. The first involves a positive relationship to the
potential indicator, examples include an incremental
adjustment to the prospective payment price for quality or
a penalty related to each patient waiting longer than the
clinically acceptable waiting time. The alternate approach
is based on thresholds: a particular level of performance is
required before the reward or penalty applies. For exam-
ple, in the original design of casemix funding in Victoria,
access to payment for additional activity was conditional
on a particular level of waiting time performance for
urgent elective surgery patients. The contemporary Victo-
rian design provides for penalties (and bonuses) relating
to particular thresholds of activity (eg. a hospital being on
ambulance bypass more than 3% of the time). Thresholds
are particularly appropriate when there are designated
minimum performance standards. Nolan and Berwick
have argued that dichotomous or 'all-or-none' measures
of performance send more powerful signals to focus qual-
ity improvement efforts [37]. However, because improve-
ments in performance below the threshold are
unrewarded, the worst performers (who are least likely to
meet the threshold) may make no effort to improve at all.
As with most aspects of incentive design, the two
approaches described here are not alternatives and can co-
exist. Thresholds could limit access to a particular incen-
tive (payment quantum) or achieving the threshold could
be a condition precedent for accessing another incentive
system (such as additional payment for additional activ-
ity, an approach used in the initial Victorian payment
design [15]). In the latter case, the threshold criteria need
not be in the same domain as the continuous incentive for
example, quality and safety performance could be a
threshold criterion for accessing an additional volume-
related payment for activity.
As with the funding arrangement as a whole, adjunct
incentives can either be capped or uncapped. There is again
a trade-off here: total expenditure potentially to be met by
the funder/purchaser versus strength of an incentive in
terms of the potential revenue to facilities/providers. Even
in a capped funding system, uncapped incentives might
be acceptable depending on the funder/purchaser's assess-
ment of the risk of providers achieving higher levels of
performance and thus earning higher levels of reward, and
the (relative) priority the funder/purchaser ascribes to that
domain.
Adjunct incentives can be structured in ways that are com-
petitive or non-competitive. In terms of competitive arrange-
ments, a bonus pool could be set aside for a particular
region or State and an individual hospital's share of that
pool would depend on its performance relative to its
peers. The initial Victorian application was of this kind in
part because of the need to cap funding [15], as is the
scheme in Rochester, New York [38]. The alternative
would be for a bonus pool to be specified for a particular
hospital and bonus payments to the hospital would be
independent of the performance of other hospitals. A
competitive bonus pool has a number of weaknesses: lack
of certainty to providers (as their bonus depends not only
on their relative not simply actual performance and, for
the funder/purchaser, the risk that small improvements in
performance might lead to very large payments, depend-
ing on overall system performance.
Incentives can be phrased and effected positively or nega-
tively: structured as 'bonuses' or incremental payments or
'penalties', reduction in funding which would otherwise
be available to the entity. Positively phrased incentives
('bonuses') will obviously be better received than nega-
tively phrased ones. But potential bonuses may become
incorporated in funding expectations and, even though
officially phrased positively, failure to achieve the bonus
may still be perceived as a penalty. Both bonuses and pen-
alties can have important motivational effects, especially
in environments (such as competitive markets) where
providers place a premium on reputation. But both
bonuses and penalties might also demotivate, in the first
instance allowing excellent providers to 'rest on their lau-
rels' and in the alternate case, inducing despondency in
poor performers and exit from the incentive system. If
penalties involve true reductions in funding for poor per-
formance, this might induce a vicious cycle where provid-
ers cannot generate discretionary funds (even on a once-
off basis) to implement necessary changes in processes to
improve their performance.
Finally, consideration needs to be given to the timing of
the incentive and payment continuity. Incentives can be
paid continuously (a premium or reduction paid for every
patient which meets criteria) or periodically. In the event
of periodic payment, the incentive should become availa-
ble to the provider at a time proximate to the performance
being recognised (quarterly, half yearly, annually), withBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/72
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more frequent payments needing to balance the risk of
confusing seasonality or chance with true underlying
change in performance coupled with the added adminis-
trative burden of frequent payments on the one hand with
the benefits of more frequent feedback on performance
and inducing desired changes in performance more fre-
quently on the other. Frequent payments will also inevita-
bly reduce each payment aliquot, potentially reducing the
strength of the incentive.
Obviously programs with different design features will
distribute rewards (and penalties) differently even if they
target the same attributes [39]. The design of an adjunct
incentive policy needs to address, explicitly or implicitly,
all of these dimensions with the appropriate choices being
influenced by history, culture, information systems, man-
agement capacity and other contextual factors specific to
the health system or services for which the purchaser/
funder is responsible. Design processes are also impor-
tant. An implementation in Maine, for example, had two
separate groups involved in incentive design: one identi-
fying and agreeing on the indicators to be used and a sec-
ond designing the incentive structure associated with the
agreed indicators [40].
Principles for use of market-like incentives
There are extensive literatures from a range of disciplines
on governance and design of incentives to influence indi-
vidual or organisational decision-making [13,17,41].
Although some research questions remain [42] and there
is still need for conceptual development [15], these litera-
tures can be used to distil a number of core principles rel-
evant to the design of market-like incentives to achieve
adjunct policy goals [43]. The core principles of econom-
ics provide the first insight: incentives apply at the margin
of behaviour and relatively small increments/decrements
in funding can be used to affect performance. A rational
manager with perfect information operating in a perfect
market (i.e. the standard assumptions of Economics 101)
will improve quality of services up to the point where the
marginal gain from improving quality equals the mar-
ginal return [44]. The impact of the marginal incentives is
thus effectively to change the returns from quality for pro-
viders who meet the criteria. Depending on a provider's
position on the marginal cost curve and whether or not
they operate in a competitive environment, different
incentive designs may not impact on the provider, or at
least not impact on them in a way that causes them to
respond to the incentive. This theoretical analysis may
explain some of the equivocal and contradictory results
from evaluations of pay for performance programs in
practice [45].
Several sub-fields of economics are also relevant [6].
Transaction cost economics has developed to inform
whether markets (or market-like incentives) versus hierar-
chies or regulation should be used to govern transactions
([4,45,46]. Similar principles apply to the choice between
market-like incentives and regulatory instruments to
achieve adjunct policy goals (for an application of the
transaction cost economics framework in the health sector
see Ashton [47]). A second stream in the economics liter-
ature, relating to the theory of contracts, can also inform
incentive design [48,49]. Here it is recognised that many
contracts are 'incomplete' in the sense that all contingen-
cies and potential responses cannot be specified in
advance and theory informs how, in these circumstances,
contracts must be written to ensure an appropriate distri-
bution of risk.
A key issue in incentive design relates to the unit that is to
be the target of incentives, and the first question here is
whether the incentive is to be focussed on an individual
manager or clinician or on an organisational unit [14,50],
and whether incentives are to be directly financial ('high
powered') or reward indirectly, through promotion
opportunities ('low powered'). This choice is not strictly
about alternatives, as performance appraisal/individual
bonuses aligned with the adjunct incentives can be used
in concert with overall payment system design (for a
recent review of individual incentives see [51], for eco-
nomics perspectives see [52-54]). Thus the performance
contract for an individual manager could have an element
specifically related to achievement of organisational
rewards flowing from a wider adjunct incentive arrange-
ment.
Incentives on the organisation as a whole can also be
passed onto the appropriate internal structures, which are
accountable for relevant aspects of performance (eg, the
management group or medical staff [55]). The choice of
organisational level to be the target of incentives will be in
part determined by the balance of centralisation and
decentralisation in the overall system design and will
depend on the degree of autonomy to be allotted to sub-
units. Greater levels of autonomy can be supported if
financial incentives promote alignment of goals of sub-
units with the overall organisation. Hospitals are charac-
terised by a high degree of interaction – sequential or
pooled interdependence to use Thompson's terms [56] –
in turn suggesting group or team performance needs to be
the focus of rewards and incentives. This choice is in part
a matter of manager preference and thus an option is to
place incentives on an organisation and allow the organi-
sation management to determine intra-organisational dis-
tribution policies.
As discussed earlier, health policy involves inherent trade-
offs between multiple objectives and competing demands
(e.g. elective surgery versus emergency care). The choice ofBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/72
Page 6 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
organisational level for funding incentives needs to take
account of where these tensions are to be resolved, further
down the organisational hierarchy or higher up depend-
ing on the centralising tendency of the organisation.
Whether incentives are targeted at individuals or organisa-
tions, the incentives need to be aligned to professional
values [57]: as the 1990s experience with managed care in
the United States suggests, financial incentives which are
antithetical to professional values create a backlash and
do not work in the long term. Provider attitude to sali-
ence, clinical relevance and other dimensions of incentive
design can be robustly measured before (and/or after) the
introduction of an incentive payment [58].
There is also choice of the organisational level for targets
in multi-hospital systems [22]. Although the international
trend is for corporatised hospitals, most Australian states
have now adopted integrated health system structures
[59], most Canadian provinces have also regionalised and
regionalisation is a common trend in many European
nations. Although they function as regional intermediate
structures between the central office and the hospital,
these "meso" structures are often integral parts of the
health authority/department and are not separately incor-
porated entities. Do they behave like 'principals' or
'agents'? A key choice in the design of incentives is thus
whether the intermediate entity is seen as part of the cen-
tral office and not subject to adjunct incentives (with
adjunct goals being driven, for example, through person-
nel appraisal) or whether system incentives will apply to
area or regional budgets. The literature offers little guid-
ance for this choice.
The fundamental principle about which there is guidance
derives from application of what works in terms of condi-
tioning, behavioural design and design of indicators. The
psychology literature has identified a number of key ele-
ments that can be synthesised into an emphasis on a clear
link between the behaviour and the reward. A condition
precedent of this is that the desired behaviour must be
measurable; that is there must be a clear and measurable
indicator that validly measures the desired behaviour or
outcomes and the associated target [22,60], in the health
sector this also implies that all indicators have been sub-
ject to appropriate risk or casemix adjustment. There must
be room for improvement [61], but the relevant target
must be achievable: if the target set is too much of a
"stretch goal", then the hospital or area may assume that
there is no point attempting to reach the target and the
whole point of the incentive is vitiated: a principle
described as the 'rule' having 'some expected usefulness'
[62]. The obverse risk to only rewarding extraordinary per-
formance change is also relevant: the incentive design
should eschew rewards for trivial change and should only
reward policy-relevant changes in performance, avoiding
the complexity inherent in managing a system of rewards
for marginal changes.
The behavioural conditioning literature here overlaps
with the management literature about the design of indi-
cators, which is summed up in the use of the acronym
SMART. Although the acronym is widely used, there is
some disagreement as to what the constituent initials
stand for! There is agreement that indicators need to be
Specific and Measurable, as discussed above. The A usu-
ally stands for Achievable, (sometimes the lexically simi-
lar, Attainable) and this is certainly consistent with
behavioural approaches. The A may also refer to Agreed,
Appropriate, or Action-oriented. Young et al have sug-
gested a key criterion is that providers are aware of the rel-
evant incentives and thus the appropriate indicators [58].
The R can stand for Relevant but may also be Realistic (if
A is not Achievable), Rewarding or Results-oriented. T can
be for Timely as discussed earlier but it is sometimes
Time-bound/Time-based or Tactical.
In line with standard behavioural design principles, the
link between the behaviour and the reward needs to be
clear and simple enough for hospital/area to be able to
understand [62]. Although there may be multiple objec-
tives that the policy maker might wish to achieve, the
more complex the formula or the more complex the
reward structure, then the effectiveness of the reward or
incentive may be undermined and hospitals and areas
may not understand what is the intent of the rewards sys-
tem and not pursue the desired targets. Incorporating per-
formance on multiple dimensions into a single measure
involves an inherent loss of transparency and disguises
potential tradeoffs and variable performance across dispa-
rate measures [63]. There must also be 'valid and compre-
hensible' management information systems to allow
managers to track performance against the goals [64].
Transaction costs and the reporting burden of new indica-
tors should be minimised [45], suggesting that indicators
used for rewarding performance in achieving adjunct
goals should build on existing (known and validated)
information systems, data collections, measures and feed
back tools.
A second principle is that the structure of adjunct incen-
tives must be stable and large enough for hospitals to
believe that introducing new processes and policies is war-
ranted [28]. The organisation changes necessary to
achieve the reward may take more than one year or policy
cycle to implement and be disruptive to established
organisational routines and hospitals must be able to
bring resources to bear to effect the necessary change [62].
If the incentive structure changes on an annual basis (or
even more frequently), then hospitals or areas may not
feel that there is sufficient stability of policy to warrant theBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/72
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internal costs of re-structure to attempt to gain what might
be seen as an ephemeral reward [12,16]. In addition to
organisational process changes, there may also be infor-
mation systems change and other costs involved in docu-
menting that an organisation meets the adjunct incentive
criterion. The net expected reward including net reputa-
tional benefits [16,40] must at least compensate for these
costs and this becomes a "participation constraint" [12].
The literature offers little guidance on what is 'large
enough' to induce participation and have an effect on
behaviour [37,65], although as indicated above, eco-
nomic theory indicates that incentives at the margin
should have the desired effects.
Thirdly, the design of adjunct incentives needs to be
aligned and consistent with all the goals of the payment
system design and with policy objectives more broadly.
The structure of adjunct incentives needs to be undertaken
with some care to ensure that there are no inadvertent per-
verse incentives such as designing objectives to achieve
improved access that can be achieved at the expense of
quality goals.
Finally, hospitals are not immune to the temptation to
game the system [66-68], and so, as with any payment sys-
tem, there needs to be an audit trail. Although it is recog-
nised that a move to casemix-based funding systems will
lead to improved recording and some 'DRG creep'
[69,70], use of patient records and other data in payment
system design may also lead to fraud. The more patient
record or other data are being used to determine levels of
payment, the more there needs to be rigorous audit of
these data sources to identify and discourage fraud. Penal-
ties for miscoding need to be stronger than simply rectify-
ing the error.
So what are the key lessons for development of adjunct
incentives:
￿ Be clear and explicit about the behaviour to be
rewarded;
￿ Design incentives so that all facilities with an opportu-
nity to improve have an opportunity to benefit;
￿ Ensure the reward structure is stable and meaningful;
￿ Monitor performance and gaming.
Conclusion
Although the evidence for pay-for-performance is still
developing [16,26] and there are still unaddressed
research questions about the design of incentive structures
[51], the introduction of formula based funding provides
the opportunity to funders and purchasers to use price or
market-like incentives to achieve a range of policy goals.
The more market-like or price incentives are used, the
more there is a natural alignment of the incentives of the
purchasers/funders and providers. Price and market-like
incentives rely on direct and measurable targets that can
be translated into price signals, but care must be taken in
the design of these market-like incentives. The structure of
the incentives must be simple enough to be understood,
stable enough to give surety to hospitals that effort in
achieving in them is warranted. Subject to these design
issues, price and market-like incentives can be used to
help improve service provision across a range of domains,
not only in terms of technical or allocative efficiency
which is often regarded as the only benefit to be achieved
from the introduction of formula funding.
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